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The law of corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the 
residual owner, limiting agency problems in representing the residual 
owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the 
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.  
—Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson (1988).1
For nearly two decades, scholars have sought to improve on the 
existing method for governing large, public companies during bankruptcy 
reorganization. In its essence, the existing method is to impose on the 
incumbent managers fiduciary duties to all parties in interest and leave 
those managers in otherwise unfettered control.2
Proposals for change have come principally from Law and Economics 
scholars who seek to motivate managers through economic incentives 
rather than legal duties.3 At the urging of Professors Baird and Jackson, 
 * Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, lopucki@law.ucla.edu. 
I thank Doug Baird, Frances Foster, Chris Frost, Bob Lawless, Ronald Mann, Bob Rasmussen, 
Richard Scheelings, David Skeel, Bill Whitford and participants in the Washington University School 
of Law’s F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium for comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the 
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 775 (1988).
 2. Martin J. Bienenstock, Between Management and the Debtor In Possession’s Fiduciary 
Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 567 (1992) (describing the existing method of governing the bankrupt 
firm and noting that “a fiduciary’s role is to act in someone else’s best interest”). 
 3. E.g., Barry E. Adler, Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the focus has been on identifying the residual owners—persons whose 
interests are identical with those of the firm as a whole—and putting those 
persons in control of the firm. This sixteen year effort has been 
unsuccessful because most firms have no single class of residual owners. 
The Law and Economics scholars’ search is for persons who do not exist. 
To illustrate the theoretical allure of the residual owner approach, 
assume a firm with $100 million in assets that owes $30 million to secured 
creditors and $200 million to unsecured creditors. If the bankruptcy 
system followed the residual owner approach, it would put representatives 
of the unsecured creditors in control of the reorganizing firm. The secured 
creditors have no real interest in this reorganization because they will be 
paid in full in any event. The shareholders have no real interest in this 
reorganization because they will not be paid at all. The unsecured creditors 
own the “residual”—that is, whatever is left after the secured creditors 
have been paid in full. All of the gains and losses from actions taken 
during the reorganization will fall to them. They are the residual owners 
and so, according to the theory, the parties with the right incentives to 
govern during reorganization. 
This example assumed the firm’s value was known and the residual 
owner’s identity obvious. Suspend either of those assumptions and the 
residual owner theory of corporate governance collapses. If claimants at 
two or more priority levels share residual owner status, their interests 
conflict and the theorist must propose some device for sharing control 
between them. 
Most bankruptcy scholars who have considered the residual owner 
approach have come away with a healthy skepticism.4 But despite its 
theoretical difficulties, the residual owner approach persists. I attribute this 
persistence to an empirical assumption that usually remains implicit. In 
spite of the theoretical difficulties in identifying the single residual owners 
of bankrupt firms, the scholars who employ residual owner approaches 
believe that in reality, residual owners exist5 and can be easily identified in 
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1994) (proposing to abolish reorganization proceedings so that 
investors can give managers securities that align the interests of managers with those of the firm); 
David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) (proposing to put unsecured creditors in control on the theory they 
are usually the residual owners). 
 4. See infra notes 10–18 and accompanying text. 
 5. For example, Skeel recognizes the difficulty in attempting to identify the residual class, but 
nevertheless assumes throughout his discussion that a single such class exists. See Skeel, supra note 3, 
at 480 (“The residual class is the first class that will be impaired if the plan proponent seeks to 
compensate as many classes in full as the firm’s assets will allow.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/4
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most cases.6 Parties may bluster about the uncertainty of firm value and 
other parties may be compelled to compromise with them in order to avoid 
an expensive, burdensome valuation process. But at bottom, those scholars 
assume that the parties all know who is in the money, who is out of it, and 
who—the residual owner—is in between. 
This Article reports the results of an empirical study designed to test 
that implicit assumption. The study concludes that no identifiable, single 
residual owner class exists in most reorganizing large public companies. 
Even by the end of the case, the parties have not been able to identify such 
a class. Part I describes the theoretical debate over the existence and utility 
of single residual owner classes in big bankruptcy cases. Part II presents 
the empirical study, beginning with a description of the universe of cases 
studied, the sources of the data, and the limitations of those sources. 
Subpart A reports and discusses the study’s findings with respect to the 
numbers of investors having different levels of priority in the reorganizing 
firm. The typical reorganizing firm has about four investor priority levels 
that are subordinate to secured and bankruptcy priority creditors. The 
existence of so many investor priority levels makes it likely that investors 
at more than one level will share residual owner status. Subpart B reports 
and discusses the study’s findings with respect to the numbers of residual 
owners actually identified by the reorganization process. The principal 
finding is that in 62% of the firms studied, the reorganization plan 
recognized that investors at more than one priority level shared residual 
owner status in a manner that left them with a substantial conflict with 
respect to investment policy. (That figure is a demonstrated minimum 
level of sharing; the actual level may be much higher.) Part III concludes 
that theories depending upon the existence of a single residual owner are 
unworkable. The problem is not merely that single residual owners are 
difficult to identify. The problem is that they rarely exist.  
I. THE RESIDUAL OWNERSHIP DEBATE 
The residual owner—typically defined as the investor who will reap the 
marginal dollar of the firm’s gain or suffer the marginal dollar of its 
 6. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
673, 696 (2003) (“When we look at recent large, prenegotiated Chapter 11 cases, one commonly 
observes that the senior bondholders are in fact the residual owners for all practical purposes.”); Skeel, 
supra note 3, at 501 n.150 (“[B]ecause firms’ fortunes usually will not improve enough in chapter 11 
to make full compensation of unsecured creditors a realistic possibility, unsecured creditors’ 
decisionmaking incentives should not be skewed in any significant way . . . In short, the skewing effect 
seems likely to be more theoretical than real.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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losses7—is a frequently-invoked hero of economic theory. By that 
definition, the residual owner’s incentives are precisely aligned with those 
of the firm. Imbued with the traits of omniscient, rational self-maximizer, 
the residual owner is in theory the perfect person to govern the firm.8 In 
maximizing its own wealth, the residual owner will maximize the firm’s 
wealth, and ultimately, social wealth.9
To implement this approach to corporate governance, however, 
requires some means for identifying the residual owner and putting that 
residual owner in control of the firm. The task has proven difficult, if not 
impossible. In thinking the matter through, bankruptcy scholars quickly 
recognized a problem with the definition of the residual owner. In the 
world of economic theory, both money and decisions are infinitely 
divisible, making it possible to talk about decisions that affect the 
marginal dollar of gains or losses.10 In reality, decisions are lumpy. A 
decision—to build a plant or cancel a product line—does not affect just 
the marginal dollar of gains or losses. It affects an indivisible range of 
marginal dollars. If, for example, a firm is close to insolvency, the 
interests of both shareholders and creditors might be affected by the same 
decision. If so, both groups would qualify as residual owners with respect 
to the decision, and their interests would be in conflict. Shareholders 
would prefer the high-risk, high-return choice because they would share 
disproportionately in the gains. Creditors would prefer the low-risk, low-
return choice, because they would suffer a disproportionate share of any 
 7. E.g., Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in 
Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 190 n.159 (1990) (“The ‘residual’ claimants in any Chapter 11 
case will be those whose claims are at the margin—that is, those claimants who stand to win or lose 
depending on the fortunes of the firm.”); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in 
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1100 (1995) (referring to the “residual 
claimants, who gain or lose at the margin from the actions of the firm”). 
 8. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 168 (1986). Jackson 
states: 
The only way that [a borrowing] decision can be made without bias is for it to be made by the 
group that will reap the benefits of a successful decision and pay the costs of an unsuccessful 
decision. That group consists of the residual claimants, who in the case of an insolvent 
company are almost always the unsecured creditors. It is they that should determine whether a 
loan is worthwhile and whether its terms are the best they can get. 
Id.; see also Triatis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1100 (“The neoclassical model of the firm proposes 
that, given an imperfect world, the optimal solution is to vest decision making authority with the 
residual claimants, who gain or lose at the margin from the actions of the firm.”). 
 9. E.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, 
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 592 (1998) (“The logic is that any action 
that helps the residual claimant will increase the value of all claims against the enterprise.”). 
 10. E.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 775 (“The dollar that is won or lost because of good 
or bad negotiating by definition is felt by the residual owner.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/4
p1341 LoPucki book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE MYTH OF THE RESIDUAL OWNER 1345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
losses. Neither group’s interests would be congruent with those of the 
firm, so neither group’s preference respecting the decision would be a 
useful guide. No single residual owner would exist, and the residual 
ownership approach to corporate governance would fail.11
Bankruptcy scholars were quick to recognize and acknowledge this and 
a host of other problems with the residual ownership approach.12 For 
example, they noted that the system could cede control to the residual 
owner only if the system had some method for identifying the person or 
group in that position. To identify the residual owner presumably would 
require valuation of the firm.13 That valuation would have to occur at the 
outset of the bankruptcy reorganization case.14 Yet, valuation is 
notoriously expensive and difficult.15 Indeed, valuation is the essence of 
the bankruptcy reorganization process. If the court could value the firm at 
the outset of the proceeding, the proceeding would no longer be 
 11. In arguing that the residual owner is a myth with respect to firms in financial distress, I do 
not mean to concede that they are any less a myth with respect to solvent firms. See Thomas A. Smith, 
The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 214, 223–25 (1999) (arguing that sole residual owners do not exist in solvent firms). 
 12. E.g., Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1991) (“Now the shareholders no longer have the right set of incentives because 
they are the residual owners of the firm over only a limited range [of values].”); Christopher W. Frost, 
The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 106 (1998) (noting the possibility that creditors and shareholders might both be 
residual owners at the same time); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance 
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 771–
76 (1993) (refuting Baird and Jackson’s concept of “collapsed” residual ownership). 
 13. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 416 
(1990) (“[H]ow does a judge identify the residual claimant when there are several layers of debt? To 
do this the judge must know the firm’s value—yet the superiority of market over judicial processes in 
pricing the firm’s assets is impetus for holding an auction. It is not particularly useful to have both a 
judicial and a market valuation process for the same corporation.”); Thomas G. Kelch, Shareholder 
Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. 
L. REV. 264, 332 (1993) (“A difficulty . . . recognized by Professor Frost is that identifying the group 
with the residual claims can be problematic. To make this determination with a reasonable degree of 
certainty requires a valuation of the debtor’s assets.”); Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency 
Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter 11, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 544 (1998) (“The costs of 
transferring voting rights to residual owners immediately upon bankruptcy would probably outweigh 
the benefits, however. Identifying the residual owners at the early stages of a Chapter 11 case would 
require valuation of all firm assets, and valuation is typically time-consuming, expensive and less than 
reliable.”). 
 14. Skeel, supra note 3 at 500 (“The residual ownership class could be identified if the Code 
were to provide for a valuation of the firm at or shortly after the filing of the chapter 11 petition.”). 
 15. Id. (“But such a valuation would be costly and would consume both physical and temporal 
resources at a time when both typically are at a premium.”); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the 
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 915 (1993) (“[T]he 
identification of the residual owner in a multi-layered hierarchical capital structure depends on a costly 
and often ambiguous valuation of the firm.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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necessary.16 The court could simply distribute claims and interests in the 
emerging firm on the basis of the absolute priority rule.17
Another problem was that the valuation necessary to identify the 
residual owner would apparently have to be made by the bankruptcy 
judge.18 That might in large part defeat the purpose of the residual owner 
approach. The purpose was to shift control of the reorganization process 
from the bankruptcy judge to a market actor.19 If the bankruptcy judges 
chose the market actors, the bankruptcy judges were at least arguably still 
in control. 
Even if the theorist found some way to finesse the valuation problem at 
the outset of the case, the firm’s value would continue to change during 
the proceeding. The identity of the residual owner might change with it.20 
To insure that control shifted to the investors at a different priority level 
when they became the residual owners, the valuation process might have 
to be continuous. Finally, scholars noted the practical difficulty of shifting 
 16. Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 112 (1992) (“If one could readily assess amounts of assets and 
liabilities, the entire bankruptcy process would be extremely simple.”). 
 17. Frost, supra note 12, at 115: 
The accurate use of this method requires an answer to the very question that bankruptcy 
resolves—the value of the business assets. If the value of the business assets were readily 
ascertainable, there would be no need for a judicially supervised reorganization process. New 
claims to the assets could be generated automatically by an application of the absolute priority 
rule. It is therefore the vagaries of business valuation that create the need for the 
reorganization process. 
Id. 
 18. But see Adler, supra note 3, at 1121 (proposing that investors contract to require that 
managers hold “inalienable” interests that “would tend to align management’s interests with holders of 
fixed obligations and would alleviate the need to have bankruptcy reorganization provide 
management” with such stakes). 
 19. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 785 (2002) (“As a comparative matter, the senior lender who will not be paid in full will more 
likely exercise control in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends on 
continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is usually not in business operations.”); Norberg, 
supra note 13, at 546 (“The residual owners have better incentives than the bankruptcy judge, who has 
no financial stake in the firm, to make efficient deployment decisions.”); Skeel, supra note 3, at 501 
(“The analysis clearly suggests that it is preferable that a majority of the firm’s unsecured creditors, 
rather than a court, approve any preconfirmation sale of substantial assets.”). 
 20. E.g., Norberg, supra note 13, at 544 (“Further, unless and until extinguished, even the equity 
interests in an insolvent firm have some value; there is always a chance that the firm’s fortunes will 
take a turn for the better and yield value to the equity interests.”); Skeel, supra note 3, at 500 
(“Moreover, as the fortunes of a bankrupt firm rise or fall during the course of a chapter 11 case, the 
firm’s residual owner could change. It is thus far from clear when or how the decisionmaking class 
should be chosen.”); Triantis, supra note 15, at 916 (“[E]ven if the court can determine the firm’s 
value, that figure will fluctuate during bankruptcy, particularly in the lengthy reorganizations of 
publicly held companies. Therefore, the loyalties of management under a residual owner rule may shift 
several times among different classes of creditors as the value of the firm fluctuates.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/4
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control from one group to another as the necessity arose. As Professor 
George Triantis put it, “bankruptcy courts may find it difficult to mandate 
shifts in the loyalties of management who are accustomed to serving 
shareholder interests. Yet the alternative of replacing management loyal to 
a prior class of residual owners may cause disruptions in operations and 
loss of firm specific expertise.”21 As a basis for governing the reorganizing 
firm, the residual owner approach appeared deeply flawed.22
Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson initially brought the 
residual owner approach to bankruptcy governance. In 1988, they argued 
that “the law of corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the 
residual owner, limiting agency problems in representing the residual 
owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the 
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.”23 Less than 
a year later, Jackson expressed doubts about the approach.24 By the early 
1990s, several writers had rejected it outright as unworkable.25
Others continued to adhere to the residual owner approach. Some 
sought to rehabilitate the approach,26 some sought to apply it indirectly as 
a means by which judges would assess situations,27 and some just 
 21. Triantis, supra note 15, at 916. 
 22. Professor Norberg raised an additional problem. Because a residual owner governance 
scheme would often displace management upon the filing of the case, management would be reluctant 
to bring firms into bankruptcy reorganization. Norberg, supra note 13, at 545 (“Finally, even if the 
residual class could be identified without undue difficulty, a rule transferring voting authority to 
residual claimants upon the filing of a petition, like a rule requiring appointment of a trustee, would 
likely deter viable businesses from seeking Chapter 11 relief until it is too late.”). 
 23. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 775. 
 24. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 159 (1989). (“The problem of 
transferring decisionmaking power from the equity owners . . . is compounded by the associated 
problem that no other class may sufficiently reflect the interests of the claimants taken as a whole. 
Thus, the objective of the collective is never entirely congruent with the objective of any of the 
constituent parts.”). 
 25. E.g., Kelch, supra note 13, at 332 (“We can never be certain that we have chosen the right 
group as the one with residual claims. To recognize this is to comprehend that we can never be assured 
that corporate control is vested in the economically correct party.”); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, 
at 1100 (“Even at the best of times, it is difficult to establish a governance process that aligns 
managerial incentives with the collective interests of all stakeholders. No single investor or class of 
investors can represent the collective interest of all stakeholders of an insolvent firm.”). 
 26. E.g., Norberg, supra note 13, at 545–50 (proposing residual owner voting on plan 
confirmation); Skeel, supra note 3 (proposing to deem unsecured creditors as a group the residual 
owners in every case). 
 27. E.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: “Don’t 
Look Back—Something May Be Gaining On You,” 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 248 n.494 (1994) (“A 
court faced with a plan that favors one class of creditors, or the shareholders, might follow Case’s 
guidelines as to when to use one approach or the other—that is, determine the identities of the residual 
owners, evaluate the plan, and ask in this light whether the DIP is overreaching.”); Frost, supra note 
12, at 114 (“When evaluating a particular decision, bankruptcy judges should attempt to discover the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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continued to invoke it without attempting to defend it.28 Like Freddy 
Kruger,29 the residual owner approach was mortally wounded in article 
after article, but would not die. 
Scholars who continue to employ the concept of residual ownership in 
bankruptcy governance proposals seem generally to acknowledge that the 
concept cannot provide a neat solution.30 But they continue to believe that 
residual ownership can work in some less precise or less direct manner, 
and thus keep corporate decision making in the hands of market actors 
and—perhaps more importantly—out of the hands of bankruptcy judges 
and fiduciaries.31 Thus, Professors Baird and Jackson sought to solve the 
problem of multiple residual owners by collapsing all future possibilities 
to present value.32 That ascribed a single value to the firm and, they 
argued, made it possible to identify a single residual owner in every case.33 
Baird and Jackson undoubtedly recognized that the incentives of the 
residual owner thus selected would not be identical to those of the firm, 
but felt the incentives would be close enough. Professor David Skeel 
proposed a similarly inelegant solution. He would have deemed the 
unsecured creditors as a group—including senior and subordinated 
views of the group that stands at the margin of solvency—the economic residual claimants.”); id. at 
115 (“Thus, while residual claim analysis cannot provide a clear rule of decision, it can be used to 
evaluate competing positions. Rather than simply ask whether a proposed business decision is correct, 
this approach asks the judge to take account of the incentives of those advocating or contesting the 
decision.”); Marshall E. Tracht, Insider Guaranties in Bankruptcy: A Framework for Analysis, 54 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 497, 508 (2000) (“Thus, the directors’ fiduciary duties run to the creditors upon 
insolvency because they become the residual claimants, the parties who stand to gain or lose based on 
the decisions made by management.”). 
 28. E.g., Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed 
Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1006 (1994) (“When a firm is clearly insolvent, 
and the face value of outstanding debt far exceeds the present discounted value of the assets, creditors, 
as the residual claimants, should have authority to decide how the firm’s assets are allocated.”). 
 29. For the historical record, Freddy Kruger is the resilient villain of the Nightmare on Elm Street 
series of horror films. See The Nightmare on Elm Street Saga, at http://www.geocities.com/ 
Hollywood/Makeup/4303/nightmare.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
 30. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 
138 (1986) (“One should not, however, exaggerate the difficulties inherent in deciding who among the 
investors should conduct the sale.”); Frost, supra note 12, at 115 (“[The vagaries of business 
valuation] present[s] an insurmountable obstacle to the full realization of such a theoretically neat 
solution.”). 
 31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 32. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 761 (“The firm that is reorganizing is typically insolvent. 
In the case that we focus on throughout this paper, if all future possibilities were collapsed to present 
values, the senior creditor would be entitled to the entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor is the 
residual owner of the firm.”). But see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12, at 771–76 (refuting Baird 
and Jackson’s concept of “collapsed” residual ownership). 
 33. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 762 n.58 (analogizing their solution to the shift of fiduciary 
duties that occurs “upon insolvency”). 
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creditors—to be the residual owners of every reorganizing corporation. 
Despite their differing priorities among themselves, all classes of creditors 
would have voted together on governance issues during reorganization.34
In an article published at the end of 2002, Professors Baird and 
Rasmussen presented a new, and more elegant version of the residual 
owner approach.35 They argued that no regulation of bankruptcy 
governance is necessary because private contracting has already succeeded 
in resolving investors’ conflicts of interest. They do not use the words 
“residual owner” or “residual claimant,” but the concept is the same. 
Contracts among the investors in the firm, they claim, vest control in “the 
senior lender who will not be paid in full.”36 Those contracts shift the 
control rights from one such lender to another as the fortunes of the firm 
change.37
Much of the law of corporate reorganizations (and indeed corporate 
law generally) is premised upon the idea that contracts set out 
control rights of the assets in a way that is fixed and rigid. Under 
this view, legal processes and rules are needed because exogenous 
events create a mismatch between incentives of the individual 
investors that possess control rights and what is in the best interests 
of the firm as a whole. As Barry Adler has pointed out, however, 
[contractual] control rights are typically defined dynamically. They 
change as the firm’s fortunes change, typically in ways that ensure 
that such mismatches do not occur.38
Thus, Baird and Rasmussen propose, the invisible hand of the market 
solved the valuation problem the theorists could not. As a result, “the 
senior lender who will not be paid in full will more likely exercise control 
in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends on 
continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is not in business 
operations.”39 Freddy Kruger is back. 
 34. Skeel, supra note 3, at 501 (“Allowing every unsecured creditor to vote would mean that the 
true residual class of unsecured creditors, as well as nonresidual classes of unsecured creditors, would 
be free to participate in the vote. Notwithstanding its limitations, however, the benefits of a clear rule 
outweigh the costs of attempting to determine precisely the firm’s residual owners.”). 
 35. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 753. 
 36. Id. at 785. 
 37. Id. at 778 (“Most large firms now allocate control rights among investors in a way that 
ensures coherent decisionmaking throughout the firm’s lifecycle.”). 
 38. Id. at 781–82 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 39. Id. at 785. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
The study includes all large, public companies emerging from 
reorganization in United States Bankruptcy Courts as public companies 
from January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1996. I identified these firms 
from the Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD). Under BRD protocols, 
firms are considered “public” if they filed an annual report with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for a year ending less than three 
years prior to the bankruptcy filing and “large” if they reported assets in 
excess of approximately $220 million.40 Ninety-eight firms met those 
requirements. 
I obtained the data regarding priority levels and plan distributions from 
the plan summaries prepared by New Generation Research and published 
on LEXIS as part of the Bankruptcy Data Source database (BDS). The 
study relies upon the accuracy of those reports. 
BDS often reported calculations of recoveries without specifying 
whether the calculations were made by plan proponents or BDS plan 
analysts. I accepted those calculations without further investigation. In 
many instances, BDS either did not calculate recoveries or did not 
calculate them in the form needed for cross-case comparisons. If the data 
were sufficient to support the necessary calculations, I made them.41
The BDS plan summaries described the distributions by classes, not 
priority levels. I converted classes to priority levels principally on the 
basis of the names of the financial instruments involved. That is, the 
 40. The protocols appear in greater detail on my Bankruptcy Research Database website. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki, WebBRD: Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Database, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ 
contents_of_the_webbrd.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
 41. In making the calculations, I followed these protocols. I valued debt instruments at face 
value. I valued stocks on the basis of projected rather than actual values, because projected values 
better indicate whether the parties to the case believed they had identified a residual owner. Where 
projections were not available, I used stock prices and numbers of shares outstanding from the Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (“CRSP”). I used the first month of trading, except in a few cases in 
which it appeared atypical based on subsequent months. In no case did I use a trading value from later 
than the second month of trading. 
 For warrants, neither projections nor trading prices were available. In each case, where the value 
of the warrants could conceivably have affected outcomes, I examined the relationship between the 
warrants and the actual trading prices of the stocks over the warrant exercise periods. In only a handful 
of cases did the stocks ever trade as high as the warrant price. For these cases, I placed no value on the 
warrants, but indicted their existence with a “+” in the Appendices. In two cases, the warrants were 
clearly in the money from the outset, but in neither did any reasonable value placed on the warrants 
affect the classification of the case. 
 As a result of the reliance on the Bankruptcy Data Source (“BDS”) calculations and these 
protocols, the valuations from this study are only approximations. The approximations are adequate, 
nevertheless, because in very few cases did case classifications depend on subtle differences in 
valuation. 
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summaries described particular classes as composed of “senior notes,” 
“12% senior subordinated debentures,” “all other unsecured claims,” or 
“Class A preferred stock.” I developed a set of protocols for determining 
priority level from those labels.42
The universe of cases studied includes only reorganizations. The 33 
cases ending in liquidation during that period were excluded. Ten of the 33 
cases produced no plan; the cases ended in conversion to Chapter 7. Plans 
existed in most of the remaining 23 cases, but summaries were not readily 
available. The bias this introduced is discussed in Part III.C. 
A. The Numbers of Investor Priority Levels in Bankrupt Firms 
1. Study Design 
The residual owner theory depends on at least a rough congruence 
between the incentives of the residual owner and the interest of the firm. 
Theoretically, that congruence could exist not just for a single person as 
residual owner, but also for a group of people whose interests were 
essentially the same. Each member of such a group would have the same 
incentives. They could be expected to act in the same manner, so it would 
not matter which of them controlled the firm. 
To illustrate, all shares of stock in a single class have the same rights. 
Absent other influences, all owners of stock of that class would have the 
same incentives with respect to the investment policies of the firm. If those 
incentives were congruent with the interests of the firm, it might not 
matter which of the shareholders were in control. Thus the single residual 
owner necessary to make the theory work would not have to be a single 
person. It could be a group of persons who each have the same interest. 
In reality, such an alignment of interests within a class of investors 
would be the exception. Investors differ in personal characteristics that 
affect preferences, such as risk aversion or wealth, and many have 
interests—other than the particular class of investment they hold—that 
 42. Even if they received materially different distributions, all unsecured creditor classes were 
assumed to be general unsecureds unless words suggesting different priority were used. The following 
words suggest differing priority: “subordinated,” “senior,” “junior,” “debenture,” and “bonds.” A class 
labeled “subordinated” was assumed to have different priority from a class labeled “senior 
subordinated.” A class labeled “senior unsecured” was assumed to have different priority from a class 
labeled “unsecured,” but only if both were paid in full or the class of unsecureds received a materially 
different distribution than the senior unsecureds. Priority levels holding less than $1 million in claims 
were not considered separate, even if their distributions differed materially. Classes of preferred stock 
were assumed to have identical priority unless they received substantially different distributions. 
Classes of common stock were all coded as a single level of priority. 
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would affect how they might govern. An unsecured creditor might also be 
a supplier to the firm. A shareholder might also be an employee. A 
bondholder might own stock. These differences constitute a substantial 
hurdle for proponents of residual owner theories, but they are not the 
subject of this study. This study proceeds on the assumption that all 
investors at the same priority level have the same interests.43
Creditor and shareholder groups often agree among themselves that 
some will have priority over others. Priority, as the concept is commonly 
employed, means that if the funds available for payment are insufficient to 
satisfy both obligations, the funds will be applied to the obligation having 
priority until it is paid in full. Only the excess, if any, will be applied to the 
subordinate obligation. 
With respect to the firm’s investment policy, the interests of investors 
with a given level of priority (hereafter referred to as an “investor priority 
level”) differ from the interests of investors at other priority levels. High 
priority level investors tend to prefer conservative policies; low priority 
level investors tend to prefer risk taking.44 This part of the study sought to 
determine the number of investor priority levels existing within each of the 
firms, ignoring secured and bankruptcy priority claims. 
An investor priority level should not be confused with a “class” of 
creditors, as that concept is employed in bankruptcy reorganization. 
Reorganization plans divide creditors and shareholders into classes. 
Creditors and shareholders are placed in a class because all have at least 
roughly similar rights under nonbankruptcy law. Members of a class 
receive the same treatment under the plan, except as agreed by each 
individual investor in the class.45 Investors at a single priority level may be 
placed in several different classes, with the result that there are often many 
more classes than priority levels. This study examines only the variation in 
distribution between priority levels, not the variation in distribution among 
classes from a single priority level. 
To illustrate the difference, plans often classify the deficiency claims of 
secured creditors separately from the claims of general unsecured creditors 
and treat the two differently, even though both groups are of the same 
priority level. Similarly, most of the plans studied classified unsecured 
 43. That they do not is reflected in varying recoveries to classes at the same priority level. The 
variations are apparent in Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74. 
 44. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12 at 672 (reporting that such conflicts actually 
arose in the Continental Airlines and Manville bankruptcies). 
 45. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000) (“[A] plan shall . . . provide the same treatment for each claim 
or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less 
favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest.”). 
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claims of less than a certain dollar amount in a separate “convenience” 
class and treated them differently. Despite these classifications and 
treatments, deficiency claims, general unsecured claims, and small 
unsecured claims are all of the same priority level. For various reasons, 
some of these claims received better treatment than others under the plans, 
but all entered the proceedings with the same legal rights—those of 
unsecured creditors. 
Because distributions to convenience and deficiency classes are often a 
function of factors other than priority level, those classes were excluded 
from the study.46 If classes of general unsecured creditors were treated 
differently without explanation, the distributions to each were included in 
the data.47 If any substantial class at a priority level qualified as a residual 
owner, the priority level was considered to be a residual owner. Plan 
proponents estimated distributions to some classes as falling within a 
range of percentages, rather than as a single percentage. In those cases, the 
ranges were included in the data.48 Ultimately, the estimation by ranges of 
percentages rather than single percentages made no difference in the 
classification of any investor priority level for purposes of this study.49
Creditors can contract for priority in specific assets. These priorities are 
nearly always in the form of security interests. Upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy case, secured creditors are entitled to “adequate protection” of 
their rights in the value of their collateral.50 With respect to the actually-
secured portions of their claims, secured creditors are not supposed to be 
substantially at risk of the firm’s investment policy. Accordingly, they 
should rarely be the firm’s residual owners. For this reason, and also 
because data on secured creditors are virtually always inadequate for 
cross-case comparisons, the secured level of priority is not included in this 
study. 
This study also ignores unsecured creditors entitled to priority under 
the bankruptcy code. They too must be paid in full for the reorganization 
to go forward over their objection.51 Rarely could they be the residual 
owners of the reorganizing firm. First, their claims are usually small in 
 46. The convenience classes in the cases studied were sufficiently small in total amount that they 
were inconsequential. 
 47. See Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74 (listing multiple recoveries at some priority 
levels).  
 48. Id.  
 49. In no case was a range broad enough to affect the classification of a case. 
 50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1). 
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring, as a condition of confirmation, that the plan provide for 
full payment to all bankruptcy priority claims). 
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relation to those of the unsecured, non-priority classes. Second, in most 
cases they are senior to unsecured classes that are being paid in full or 
nearly in full. 
Six types of priority levels remain: (1) common shareholders, (2) 
preferred shareholders, (3) junior subordinated creditors, (4) senior 
subordinated creditors, (5) unsecured creditors, and (6) senior creditors. 
Creditors are “senior” if they have contracted to receive the pro rata 
distribution owing to another, subordinated class. Thus, even though 
senior creditors do not have priority over unsecured creditors, they may 
receive full payment in a case where unsecured creditors do not. 
Almost invariably, reorganizing large public companies are corporate 
groups rather than single entities.52 A corporate group consists of a parent 
corporation and one or more subsidiaries. Entities, not groups, file 
bankruptcy cases. But once members of a group have filed, the bankruptcy 
court consolidates the cases administratively. The effect of this 
“administrative consolidation” is that the court administers the cases in 
most respects as if they were a single case. The entities in the group are 
likely to have a single management and be represented by a single set of 
professionals. Thus they are likely to adopt a single investment policy.  
Unless the court also consolidates the estates of the group members 
substantively, creditors and shareholders continue to have claims against 
the specific entities with which they originally dealt. If expected 
recoveries differ across entities, so do creditor and shareholder incentives. 
To illustrate, the unsecured creditors of entity A, which is expected to pay 
95 cents on the dollar to unsecured creditors, would have little to gain 
from risk-taking and much to lose. The unsecured creditors of Entity B, 
which is expected to pay 5 cents on the dollar, would have much to gain 
from risk taking and little to lose. Both these creditor groups are general 
unsecured creditors. But because they are creditors of different entities in 
the group, the two group’s interests are in conflict with each other and 
with the interests of the corporate group as a whole. Neither creditor group 
can be the sole residual claimant with respect to the relevant governance 
unit, which is the corporate group as a whole. 
Because each entity in a group has its own financial structure, each 
potentially has its own residual owner or owners. Consider, for example, 
an insolvent parent corporation that owns all of the stock of two 
subsidiaries. Subsidiary A is solvent, Subsidiary B is not. Each of the three 
 52. The BRD records the numbers of entities comprising the corporate groups for 310 
bankruptcy cases filed from 1980 to 2000. The number of “groups” composed of only a single entity is 
6 (2%). See LoPucki, supra note 40. 
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corporations has a single class of unsecured debt. 
On these facts, the unsecured creditors of Subsidiary B are the residual 
owners of Subsidiary B. The unsecured creditors of the parent corporation 
are the residual owners of the parent corporation and Subsidiary A. That 
is, any increase in the value of Subsidiary A will accrue to the benefit of 
the parent corporation as the sole shareholder of Subsidiary A. That 
increase in the value of the parent corporation will accrue to the unsecured 
creditors of the parent corporation, as residual owners of the parent 
corporation. The investors in this corporate group are at four levels of 
priority: three levels of unsecured creditors and the shareholders of the 
parent corporation. 
Among the firms studied, the average number of entities in the 
corporate group was 26 and the median number 17. Potentially, that 
created a huge number of different investor priority levels. That huge 
potential did not manifest in the reorganization plans. Only 14 of the 84 
plans analyzed (17%) provided for distributions that differed by entity. In 
most of the 14, only two entities were mentioned. The plan summaries did 
not indicate whether the numbers were small because few entities in a 
group incurred debt or because plan drafters consolidated the estates by 
provisions of the plan. 
The method employed in this study recognizes investor priority levels 
resulting from the existence of multiple entities only if investors at those 
levels received different distributions. To illustrate, if a plan provided for 
distributions to unsecured creditors of the parent based on the financial 
condition of the parent and to unsecured creditors of a subsidiary based on 
the financial condition of the subsidiary, I recorded two unsecured creditor 
priority levels. If, however, a plan provided the same distribution for 
unsecured creditors of the parent and the subsidiary, I recorded one 
unsecured creditor priority level, even if the plan classified the creditors 
separately. Classes of intra-company claims and interests—that is, claims 
or stock held by other members of the corporate group—were not counted 
as investor priority levels. 
The purpose of this part of the study was to determine the number of 
investor priority levels existing in the financial structure of the 
reorganizing firms. Each level represents an actual group of investors 
whose interests could potentially have conflicted with investors at all other 
levels. Whether that potential conflict became an actual conflict depended, 
for each firm, on the range of possible firm values at the time of 
bankruptcy and the contractual relationship among the investors at 
different priority levels. 
Of the 98 reorganizing firms in the targeted universe, the data were 
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sufficient to support analysis of 84 (86%). The insufficiencies derived 
from two sources. BDS did not summarize a few of the plans. In others, 
the summary information was insufficient to show the investors’ priority 
levels. 
2. Findings 
Appendix A shows the numbers of priority levels existing in each of 
the 84 reorganizing firms for which data were available. Column (2) 
shows that the numbers of investor priority levels ranged from a high of 13 
to a low of two. Every firm had common shareholders (column (8)) and at 
least one class of general unsecured creditors (column (4)). The large 
majority of firms (79%) had at least one class of contractually-
subordinated debt designated as “senior subordinated” (column (5)). Most 
also had either a class of junior subordinated debt (column (6)) or 
preferred stock (column (7)). Only 18 (21%) had a class of unsecured 
senior debt (column (3)). Firms that had a subordinated class of unsecured 
creditors but not a senior class of unsecured creditors probably had a 
senior class of secured creditors. Because the senior class was secured, 
that class does not appear in the data. 
Only 14 firms (17%) had separate priority levels resulting from the 
recognition of separate entities.53 But nine of the 19 firms with six or more 
priority levels (47%) had separate priority levels resulting from the 
recognition of separate entities. If a firm incurs debt through multiple 
subsidiaries, the number of investor priority levels can multiply rapidly. 
The average number of priority levels was 4.3, the median 4. To the 
extent that any structure can be described accurately as “typical” it would 
be a firm with four or five priority levels subordinate to bankruptcy 
priority creditors. That firm would have common shareholders, unsecured 
creditors, senior subordinated debt, and either junior subordinated debt or 
preferred stock. The typical firm would not have senior unsecured debt or 
investor priority levels resulting from the recognition of separate entities. 
The paradigm financial structure in the legal literature is a firm with 
common stock, unsecured debt, and secured debt54—a combination that 
would be characterized as having two investor priority levels for the 
purpose of this study. Perhaps the most striking finding from this part of 
the study is that only 7 of the 84 firms studied (8%) fit the paradigm.  
 53. These firms are indicated by an asterisk in Appendix C, column (8). 
 54. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 32. (“Under much modern corporate law it is most useful 
to view shareholders, unsecured creditors, and secured creditors as the owners of the firm.”). 
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3. Discussion 
The findings with respect to the number of investor priority levels 
show that theorists who seek to identify and empower the residual owner 
are working on difficult terrain. Firms have multiple investor priority 
levels in their financial structures. When the value of the firm is uncertain, 
the likelihood that the range of possible values will stretch across priority 
levels is great. When it does, no single residual owner can be identified 
because none exists. 
The cases analyzed in this study were drawn from an era in which junk 
bond financing was common. Had the universe been drawn from a 
different era, the numbers of priority levels may have been lower—or 
higher. 
That does not matter, however, to the problem at hand. Bankruptcy 
theorists are not in the business of designing regimes that will work in 
some eras but not in others. Changes in bankruptcy law and contracting 
take years to work through the system. A solution inadequate to firms 
emerging from 1991 to 1996 should not be adopted even if the current 
crop of bankrupt firms have simpler financial structures. 
B. The Residual Owners of Bankrupt Firms 
The analysis reported in the preceding section addresses the potential 
for investors at two or more priority levels to share the status of residual 
owners. This section reports on the frequency with which that actually 
occurred. 
1. Study Design  
The study design rests on two assumptions. The first is that when 
investors at two or more priority levels each have recoveries that are 
substantial but not substantially full, they share in the marginal dollar of 
gains or losses. They are co-residual owners with conflicting interests. For 
this purpose, a recovery is “substantial but not substantially full” if it 
represents at least ten cents and not more than 90 cents on the dollar to 
each of the two major classes involved. To put it another way, the study 
design assumes that recoveries of up to about 10% can result from 
nuisance value or errors in measurement, and so not indicate a substantial 
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sharing in the marginal dollar of gains or losses. My earlier work with 
Professor William Whitford supports the use of 10% as a cutoff.55  
To illustrate this first assumption, if the plan proposes to pay 88 cents 
on the dollar to a senior class of creditors and 12 cents on the dollar to a 
junior class, I assumed that both classes were residual owners. That is, if 
the firm had earned more than it did between the filing of the bankruptcy 
case and the fixing of recoveries under the plan, both classes would have 
shared in the additional earnings—for the same reasons they shared in the 
actual earnings. If, instead, the plan had proposed to pay 88 cents to the 
senior class and 2 cents to the junior class, I did not assume that the junior 
class was a residual owner. The senior class might not have believed that 
the junior class was entitled to anything at all, but nevertheless agreed to 
payment of the nuisance value of its claim. Had the firm earned more than 
it did, the nuisance value—which is a function of the amount of trouble 
the junior class could have caused the senior class, not the amount the 
junior class could have won for itself—might not have changed. If not, the 
junior class would not have shared in the marginal dollar of gain (or loss) 
and so should not be considered a residual owner. 
Sharing in the marginal dollar of gains and losses is not always the 
result of uncertainty regarding firm value or a deviation from absolute 
priority. The pattern can flow from strict enforcement of rights under 
subordination agreements when firm value is known. 
To illustrate, assume a firm with 132 in assets, and three classes of 
unsecured creditors, each owed 100. Absent agreement, each class would 
be entitled to a recovery of 44, which is 44 cents on the dollar.56 But if the 
Junior class entered into a typical subordination agreement, it contracted to 
surrender its recovery to the Senior class until the Senior class has been 
paid in full. In this example, the Junior class would surrender its entire 
recovery—44—to the Senior class. The result would be a distribution of 
88 to the Senior class, 44 to the General Unsecured class, and nothing to 
the Junior class. 
In this illustration, a precise firm value was assumed, and no deviation 
from absolute priority has occurred. Nevertheless, the Senior and General 
 55. In a study of deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity in 43 cases filed in the early 
and mid-1980s, we found on the basis of interview answers that the plan negotiators were confident of 
insolvency in 30. The deviation from absolute priority in favor of equity exceeded 8.1% in only 2 of 
the 30 cases (7%). Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142–44 
(1990) (showing the pattern of deviations and describing the interviews regarding the beliefs of the 
negotiators). Equity recoveries were substantial in 11 of 12 cases of solvent debtors. Id. at 166. 
 56. 132/(100 + 100 + 100) = .44. 
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Unsecured classes share in the marginal dollar of gains. If assets in the 
above example increase by one, two-thirds of that one will go to the senior 
class and the remaining one-third will go to the General Unsecured class. 
Because both classes share in the marginal dollar of gains, both qualify as 
residual owners. They have conflicting interests with respect to the firm’s 
investment policy. With an expected recovery of 88 cents on the dollar, the 
Senior class has relatively little to gain from risk taking. With an expected 
recovery of only 44 cents on the dollar, the General Unsecured class has 
much to gain from it.57
The second assumption of the study design is that firm value is 
sufficiently volatile that an award of near full recovery to one priority level 
combined with only a nominal recovery to the next lower level 
demonstrates that creditors at neither level could be confident of their 
recovery at earlier stages of the bankruptcy case. Each would have had an 
interest in controlling the firm’s investment policy for their own benefit 
during the case, so that both should be considered residual owners. For 
this purpose, a “near full recovery” is one that exceeds 90 cents on the 
dollar and a nominal recovery is one less than 10 cents on the dollar. This 
second assumption identified only two of the 48 multiple-residual owner 
cases (4%), making it of relatively minor importance.58
These assumptions may not be accurate with respect to borderline 
cases. But direct examination of the data in the Appendices will show that 
the results are robust. The findings are not driven by close cases.  
2. Findings 
Data were sufficient for analysis in 78 of the 98 target cases (80%). In 
48 of the 78 cases (62%), investors from more than one priority level 
qualified as residual owners under one of the two tests described in the 
preceding section. Table 1 shows the number of reorganizing firms with 
various numbers of residual owners. 
 57. The pattern of sharing in subordination cases is actually more complex than this example 
would suggest. The legal effect of the subordination agreements in common use today is uncertain. 
Both contests and compromises are common. E.g., In re Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 301 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (contest over the meaning of a commonly used subordination agreement); LoPucki & 
Whitford, supra note 55, at 160 n.76 (empirical study noting several challenges to subordination 
agreements). 
 58. The cases were Gilbert/Robinson and WTD Industries. 
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Table 1. Firms With Multiple Residual Owners,  
By Number of Investor Priority Levels Involved 
Number of investor priority 
levels sharing residual 
owner status 
Number of firms Percent of firms 
1 30 38% 
2 28 36% 
3 11 14% 
4 5 6% 
5 2 3% 
Over 5 2 3% 
Total 78 100% 
 
Appendix C provides more detail with respect to distributions by the 48 
reorganizing firms having more than one residual owner. 
Table 2 summarizes the data regarding firms with only a single residual 
owner. The table shows that if a firm has only a single residual owner, that 
owner is most likely to be the senior subordinated class. The next most 
common single residual owners were unsecured creditors and common 
stockholders. 
Table 2. Residual Owners 
Firms Having Only One Residual Owner 
Priority level of 
 residual owners 
Number of 
firms 
Percent of all 
firms 
Percent of single 
residual owner 
firms 
Unsecured creditors 9 12% 30% 
Senior subordinated 10 13% 33% 
Junior subordinated 1 1% 3% 
Preferred stock 1 1% 3% 
Common stock 9 12% 30% 
All firms with single 
 residual owner 
30 39% 
(due to 
rounding) 
99% 
(due to 
rounding) 
 
Appendix B provides greater detail regarding the distributions by 
reorganizing firms having only a single residual owner class. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/4
p1341 LoPucki book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE MYTH OF THE RESIDUAL OWNER 1361 
 
 
 
 
3. Discussion 
In at least 62% of large public company reorganizations, no identifiable 
single residual owner exists. Instead, two or more groups with conflicting 
interests with respect to the firm’s investment policy share the marginal 
dollar of gain or loss. The effect is to render unworkable virtually any 
bankruptcy governance scheme that depends on identification of the 
residual owner. 
In two important respects, the methods employed in this study tend to 
understate the difficulty in identifying single, residual owners. First, the 
study determined the numbers of residual owners by examining the 
distributions under confirmed plans. The terms of confirmed plans are 
often fixed only late in the bankruptcy process, after the parties have had a 
full opportunity to develop and test their analyses and understandings, and 
usually after the negotiators have seen some reports of post filing 
operations. By contrast, a comprehensive bankruptcy governance scheme 
must go into effect at the beginning of the case. At that time, the task of 
identifying residual owners might be considerably more difficult. 
Second, the study’s methods provide a very conservative estimate of 
the number of investor priority levels whose interests conflict with those 
of the firm. By using outcome data to assess investor interests, the method 
implicitly assumed that the outcome of each of these cases—
reorganization yielding a particular distribution—was inevitable. In fact, 
the outcomes probably were not. Consider, for example, the ten firms 
shown in Appendix B to have paid 100 cents on the dollar to all their 
creditors. Because the creditors recovered the full amounts owing them, 
the creditors are not classified as residual owners. But the creditors in each 
of these ten bankruptcy cases were probably significantly at risk. Had 
those risks resolved differently, they would have lost money. Were it not 
for the possibilities those risks would have resolved differently, the firms 
would not have needed to file bankruptcy. 
The study’s methods treat these creditors as having had no conflict 
with shareholders as to the firm’s investment policy, even though most 
probably did. The same is true for other investor priority levels considered 
non-residual in the cases listed in Appendix B. As a result, this study’s 
finding of single residual owners in 38% of reorganizing firms probably 
overestimates substantially. 
The findings from this Part have implications for several proposed 
schemes of bankruptcy governance. Professor Norberg, for example, 
rested his proposal on the assumption that although a single class of 
residual owners could not be identified at the beginning of reorganization 
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cases, such a class could be identified by the end.59 The data indicate that 
this is true for only a minority of cases. 
Professors Baird and Jackson proposed to identify residual owners by 
collapsing the possibilities as to future firm values to establish a single 
value for the firm.60 The data from this study show that proposal, even if 
implemented perfectly, would place control of the firm in the hands of a 
group with interests significantly different from those of the firm as a 
whole in more than 62% of cases. 
Professor Skeel proposed that all unsecured creditors, regardless of 
priority level, should vote on governance issues as a single class.61 The 
data from this study suggest that, under Skeel’s proposal, the creditors 
voting in 9 of the 78 cases (12%) may have had no residual owners among 
them, because shareholders were the sole residual owners. The creditors 
voting in an additional 56 cases (72%) would have substantial priority 
conflicts among them.62
Finally, Baird and Rasmussen argued that contracting parties solve the 
bankruptcy governance problem by dynamically allocating “control 
rights”63 to a succession of “single investor[s]”64 so there is no “mismatch 
between incentives of the individual investors that possess control rights 
and what is in the best interests of the firm as a whole.”65 The data from 
this study cast doubt on that possibility. No single investor group with 
incentives matching those of the firm existed in the large majority of the 
cases studied. 
Baird and Rasmussen characterize banks and financial institutions, 
acting in the capacity of prepetition secured lenders or debtor-in-
possession lenders (“DIP lenders”), as the residual owners and controllers 
of reorganizing firms.66 Secured and DIP lenders were not directly the 
 59. Norberg, supra note 13, at 543–50. 
 60. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 761 (“The first that is reorganizing is typically insolvent. In 
the case that we focus on . . . , if all future possibilities were collapsed to present values, the senior 
creditor would be entitled to the entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor would be entitled to the 
entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor is the residual owner of the firm.”). 
 61. See supra note 32. 
 62. Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74. This figure is derived by counting the cases in which 
creditors at two or more priority levels recovered different percentages of their claims, including 
priority levels that were paid in full or received no distribution. 
 63. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 782 (“[C]ontrol rights are typically defined 
dynamically.”). 
 64. Id. at 785 (“To be sure, a firm might find itself caught up in a sudden crisis, and no single 
investor may be able to take control. But these cases are increasingly rare.”). 
 65. Id. at 781. 
 66. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons From Enron, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1807 (2002) (“In the case of a large firm in bankruptcy, we find that, at the 
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subject of this study. But in the large majority of the cases studied, secured 
and/or DIP lenders had rights senior to the priority levels studied. The DIP 
lenders had priority over unsecured creditors and so were protected by 
substantial cushions of equity in nearly every case.67 The secured lenders 
were entitled to adequate protection and so, with respect to the secured 
portions of their claims, should not have been at risk at all. Thus, the 
control exercised by DIP lenders is rarely control by a residual owner.68  
Secured lenders sometimes had unsecured deficiency claims. But in 
most of the cases studied, such deficiency claims would have been paid in 
full.69 It is a reasonable assumption that secured bank lenders fared no 
worse on their deficiency claims than the best recovery listed in Appendix 
B or C for each case. Those best recoveries were substantial in the large 
majority of cases. The data from this study suggest that the interests of 
banks and financial institutions probably were not at substantial risk in the 
cases studied. 
The financial structures of reorganizing firms fluctuate over time. Less 
of the firm’s value belongs to unsecured creditors in today’s 
reorganizations than in the reorganizations studied.70 But the unsecured 
creditors’ stake in today’s reorganization is hardly negligible.71 When they 
deliver control rights to secured creditors or DIP lenders, the contracts 
Baird and Rasmussen describe are delivering control rights not to sole 
residual owners, but to institutionally powerful classes that may not even 
be the firms’ principal risk bearers.72
moment Chapter 11 is filed, a revolving credit facility is already in place that entrusts decisionmaking 
authority to a single entity. This entity will often step in and replace management. It will make the 
necessary operational decisions before Chapter 11 begins.”). 
 Baird and Rasmussen portray these creditors as simply having control. Professor Stephen Lubben 
provides a more nuanced theory that portrays them as sharing control with other participants in the 
case. Stephen J. Lubben, Learning the Wrong Lessons: Baird and Rasmussen’s Third Lesson of Enron 
and the Inherent Ambiguity of Control (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
 67. In over half of the cases, a class of unsecured creditors recovered 100 cents on the dollar. In 
all cases, a class of unsecured creditors recovered more than 18 cents on the dollar. The debtor-in-
possession lender would have priority over all these classes. 
 68. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 936 (2003) (questioning whether DIP financers “have appropriate decision 
making incentives during the Chapter 11 case”). 
 69. In 41 of the 78 cases (53%), unsecured creditors were paid in full. 
 70. A preliminary survey of reorganization plans from the period 2001–02 indicates that 
unsecured creditors recover 10% or less in about 29% of cases, 11% to 49% in about 33% of cases, 
50% to 99% in about 13% of cases, and 100% in about 25% of cases. The corresponding percentages 
for the cases studied are zero, 27%, 15%, and 59%. See Appendices B and C infra at 1373–74. Lynn 
M. LoPucki, Preliminary Survey (spreadsheet on file with author) (2003). 
 71. Id. 
 72. For example, the preliminary survey mentioned in the previous note discovered no case in 
which a DIP lender recovered less than the full amount owing. 
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The classes gaining control rights under those contracts are biased in 
favor of liquidation. Perhaps the increase in the number of liquidations 
since 1998 is to some degree attributable to that bias.73 The legislative 
history of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly and correctly rejected the idea 
that protection of the public investors in stocks and bonds should be left 
“to a plan negotiated by a debtor in distress and senior institutional 
creditors who will have their own interests to look after.”74
Finally, some scholars who realize that no single, identifiable residual 
owner exists nevertheless believe the residual owner concept can be useful 
in identifying and excluding non-residual owner classes from 
governance.75 Those scholars may take hope from the fact that many non-
residual owners can be identified in the data.76  
Whitford and I argued that the bankruptcy system should identify those 
who clearly and obviously are not residual owners and deny them estate-
funded representation.77 That falls far short, however, of specifying a 
useful mechanism by which the remaining investors could govern. No 
means have yet been suggested to unite the interests of co-residual owners 
and align them sufficiently with those of firm to provide effective 
governance.78
III. A BRIEF RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RASMUSSEN 
In his comment on this article, Professor Robert K. Rasmussen points 
out that my data do not prove that the current system of bankruptcy 
governance maximizes the value of bankrupt enterprises.79 In that, he is 
correct. My methodology had a more modest goal. As Rasmussen aptly 
 73. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Bankruptcy Boom (unpublished manuscript 2003) (graph showing a 
large increase in bankruptcy liquidation of large, public companies since 1998). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 95-598, at 10 (1977). 
 75. E.g., Frost, supra note 12, at 115. 
 76. Of course, the number who can be identified in this end-of-the-case data is probably 
considerably larger than could be identified sufficiently early in the case to yield governance benefits. 
 77. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 
(1991) (arguing for “‘preemptive cram down’ orders extinguishing the interest of the shareholders of 
clearly insolvent debtors”). 
 78. Skeel’s proposal that all co-residual owners vote as a single class, supra note 2–6, does not 
work. To illustrate the problem, assume two investor priority levels, senior and junior. The senior 
would tend to favor liquidation, the junior would tend to favor reorganization. If every investor voted 
its self-interest, the outcome of the vote would depend not on the desirability of liquidation or 
reorganization, but merely on which priority level had the larger amount of claims. 
 79. Robert K Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors and Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1468 (2004) (“What he has failed to do, however, 
is to demonstrate that those who make decisions today do so in a way that does not maximize the value 
of the enterprise.”). 
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put it, that goal was “to shake the faith of those who believe that the fate of 
financially distressed firms is best determined by those with their money 
on the line.”80 Those with their money on the line are the residual owners. 
I assumed that proving it impossible to identify them and put them in 
control would doom the idea of direct investor governance during 
bankruptcy. The system of fiduciary control contemplated by the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code would be the only viable alternative. 
Professor Rasmussen has, however, come up with a third possibility. 
The courts could honor contracts by which debtors have ceded “control” to 
particular creditors. Rasmussen seems to acknowledge that the controllers 
thus selected would be neither single residual owners, nor coalitions of 
residual owners. The controllers’ interests might conflict with those of 
other creditors and of the firm. But those conflicts, Rasmussen posits, may 
not have any appreciable effect on investment policy. Stakeholders who 
compete for control, he argues, do not “fight over how to increase the size 
of the pie”81 they fight only over the sizes of their respective pieces. When 
it comes to the selection of investment policies, the stakeholders’ common 
interest maximizing the total value of the emerging firm so far outweighs 
their conflicting interests in maximizing their individual shares that the 
latter can safely be ignored. To maximize firm value, all that is needed is 
that “those who have a voice in making [the] decision[s] have both the 
skill and [some] incentive to make [them] correctly.”82
In context, Rasmussen’s claim is essentially that the other creditors can 
trust the DIP lender to act in the interests of all when making the decision 
to call the loan and liquidate the business. Professor Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook recently argued convincingly to the contrary 
“[N]eutrality is a necessary concept in any system for managing a 
general default in which the policy maker provides for multiple 
beneficiaries and charges the manager with maximizing value for all 
of them. A dominant secured party cannot be a neutral manager, and 
its management creates a serious potential of loss for other 
beneficiaries. It is just that result that provided the impetus for a 
major restructuring of the insolvency system in Britain.83
 80. Id. at 1446. 
 81. Id. at 1448 (“What they do not do, however, is fight over how to increase the size of the 
pie.”). 
 82. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 
696 (2003). 
 83. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 852 
(2004). 
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In the absence of empirical evidence, I am inclined to agree with 
Westbrook. (It is no small irony that the two of us, who have been 
economic skeptics, should find ourselves arguing that economic 
incentives matter, and that the leading law and economics 
scholars—Baird and Rasmussen—should be on the other side, 
insisting that conflicting economic incentives can safely be ignored.) 
Rasmussen may be correct in his assertion that investors at 
different priority levels seldom actually clash over the firm’s 
investment policy. But that does not mean that, given the chance, 
investors at different priority levels would make the same decisions. 
Clashes over investment policy did occur in the 1980s. Creditors 
routinely forced the resignations of managers and replaced them 
with others who governed more to the creditors’ liking.84 In the 
1990s, the bankruptcy courts began competing for the favor of 
managers who could bring them big cases.85 As a result, creditors 
are less able to force failed managers from office and so less able to 
contest the direction that management (and in some cases the DIP 
lender) set for the company.86 The failure of various creditor groups 
to maintain corporate governments-in-exile that clash with managers 
over investment policy does not mean, however, that given control, 
those groups would make the same investments. They have different 
incentives, and will pursue them up to the point where the courts 
call a halt to it. Thus, I see no reason to believe that governance by 
contractual designee will mean neutral governance. I look forward 
to the coming debate over Baird and Rasmussen’s theory of “control 
rights.” 
I hope that the debate over the empowerment of the residual 
owner is now at an end. From Rasmussen’s Comment, that is not 
entirely clear. Early in that Comment, he identifies two uses of the 
 84. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 723–37 (1993) 
(empirical study finding high rates of CEO turnover); id. at 746–48 (empirical study concluding that 
creditors dominated many debtor managements). 
 85. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 16–18 (2005) (explaining the corrupting power of the 
competition). 
 86. Id. at 143–45 (explaining the inability of competing courts to force changes of management). 
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residual owner concept. The first is as a “yardstick,”87 or “metric”88 
by which to evaluate corporate governance. Rasmussen concludes 
that the “sole owner” better serves that purpose,89 suggesting that we 
will hear no more of residual owner as a yardstick. 
The second use of the residual owner concept he describes as 
“more direct. It would attempt by law to vest control rights directly 
in the residual claimants. It is this use of the residual owner standard 
that is LoPucki’s focus here.”90 Rasmussen never directly tells us 
what he thinks of this second use. His failure to endorse it in these 
circumstances, however, suggests that at long last Freddy is really, 
finally, dead. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Many scholars are committed to the idea that market actors with their 
own money at stake—residual owners—can better decide the fate of 
reorganizing firms than bankruptcy judges. That commitment led to a 
sixteen-year effort to discover a way of identifying and empowering the 
single residual owner of the reorganizing firm. It is time to recognize that 
the effort has failed. This study has shown that most reorganizing 
companies have no single residual owner and suggests that companies 
with single residual owners are rare. Neither courts nor contracts can put 
the single residual owner in control of the reorganizing firm because the 
single residual owner does not exist. 
The effort to identify and empower residual owners is not merely futile, 
it is dangerous. Some scholars have argued that secured and DIP lenders 
are the residual owners of reorganizing firms and applauded those lenders’ 
efforts to take control.91 Those scholars have been influential. In many 
 87. Rasmussen, supra note 79, at 1453 (“The [residual owner] insight could be deployed two 
ways. One is as a yardstick. We ascertain which groups or groups is in control of the process and then 
compare their incentives to that of a residual owner . . . .”). 
 88. Id. at 1459 (“The residual owner concept . . . is a metric by which to assess the structure of 
governance rights in corporations.”). 
 89. Rasmussen, supra note 79, at 1453 (“or, in an even better metric, that of a sole owner”). 
Presumably, the “sole owner” is a better metric because it is simpler and easier to understand. By that 
standard, the traditional legal standard, the “interests of the estate,” would be better yet. 
 90. Id.  
 91. E.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 785 (applauding the supposed shift in power 
from bankruptcy judges to secured lenders); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 695 (arguing that 
“[p]roviders of new cash . . . at first approximation, have exactly the right incentive”). In fact, 
providers of new cash to bankrupt businesses ordinarily have incentives that cause them to favor 
investment policies far more conservative than the policies that would maximize the value of the firm. 
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cases, senior lenders who are not at risk have succeeded in gaining control. 
As a result, the system may be liquidating firms that it should reorganize. 
Pseudo-residual owners have interests that differ from those of the 
firm. Even if the differences are small, they may be capable of deflecting 
firm investment policy. In 1993, Whitford and I discovered that even 
subtle shifts in investment policy—management’s pursuit of potentially 
small gains in firm value—could result in much larger shifts of risk among 
investors.92 Thus, small deviations of the controlling owner’s interests 
from the firm’s interests can create huge conflicts among the parties in 
interest. This study has shown that in a system that attempted to identify 
and empower the residual owner, such conflicts would be ubiquitous. 
The scholars who have been leading the effort to identify and empower 
the single residual owner misunderstand the existing system. They assume 
that judges make the reorganization-liquidation decision under current 
procedure.93 Judges do not. Managers remain in control of reorganizing 
firms. The reorganization-liquidation decision is committed to the 
managers’ business judgment and so is virtually beyond judicial review.94 
DIP lenders have high priority, are usually fully secured, and bear very little risk. 
 92. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12, at 788–96. Whitford and I proposed a system for 
ameliorating those conflicts. The system would have required debtors to compensate classes whose 
expectancies are disproportionately risked in pursuit of the interests of the firm as a whole. Id. 
(proposing risk compensation payments); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating 
Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 
(1994) (elaborating on risk compensation proposal). Those “risk compensation payments” would give 
unsecured creditors protection analogous to that provided secured creditors by “adequate protection 
payments.” Id. at 1146–47 (analogizing risk compensation payments for unsecured creditors to 
adequate protection payments for secured creditors). 
 93. Supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 94. One court described the test applicable to the prepetition sale of all or part of the firm as 
follows: 
This Court follows the “sound business purpose” test when examining § 363(b) sales . . . . 
The test consists of four elements. A trustee or debtor-in-possession must prove that: (1) a 
sound business reason or emergency justifies a pre-confirmation sale; (2) adequate and 
reasonable notice of the sale was provided to interested parties; (3) the sale has been proposed 
in good faith: and (4) the purchase price is fair and reasonable. The first requirement is a 
sound business reason justifying the pre-confirmation sales. This element is similar to many 
states “business judgment rule” where great deference is given to a business in determining its 
own best interests. 
In re W.A. Mallory Co., Inc., 214 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). 
 If the sale is proposed as part of a plan of reorganization, the judge is supposed to review it. Lynn 
M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331, 346–47 (2001) 
(explaining the feasibility requirement). But many courts simply defer to the decision of the parties, 
and those courts that do review do not make the business decision but merely decide whether the plan 
proponent’s decision is feasible. 
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The managers of reorganizing firms do not have their own money at risk, 
but neither do the managers of public companies generally.95
The current form of bankruptcy governance is not perfect, but it is 
fundamentally sound. That form recognizes that the prepetition contracts 
among investors were not intended to govern the firm in bankruptcy, but 
merely to deliver the firm to the bankruptcy court. The court will 
safeguard the firm during the brief time necessary for the investors to 
recontract. In the interim, the bankruptcy system provides the only form of 
governance practical in the circumstances: a benevolent dictatorship of the 
board as fiduciary and the bankruptcy judge as referee. The involvement 
of judges in bankruptcy governance is not the problem, but the solution. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the reorganization process works 
best in districts where the bankruptcy judges are active participants, and 
fails dismally in those that allow the market actors free rein.96
 95. The decision to reorganize or liquidate—which judges rarely make or review—should be 
distinguished from the decision whether a particular plan of reorganization or liquidation will work—a 
decision the board makes and that judges are required to review. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000). 
 96. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in 
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 
(2001) (showing failure rates for Delaware- and New York-reorganized firms that are five to seven 
times the corresponding rates for other courts); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are 
Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002) 
(showing failure rates for Delaware-reorganized firms that are more than ten times the corresponding 
rates for courts other than Delaware and New York). 
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Appendix A. Investor Priority Levels in Reorganizing Firms 
(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Number of 
investor 
priority 
levels 
(3) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(4) 
Unsecured
(5) 
Senior-
subordinated
(6) 
Junior 
subordinated
(7) 
Preferred 
stock 
(8) 
Common 
stock 
LTV Corporation 13 3 5 3  1 1 
Days Inn of America 8 1 1 1 4  1 
Lomas Financial (1989) 8 1 1 2  3 1 
National Gypsum Corp. 7 1 2 1 1  2 
Charter Medical 7  1 1 2 2 1 
Tracor 7  1 2 3  1 
Cherokee, Inc. 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Envirodyne Industries 6 1 2 1 1  1 
Kash N Karry 6 1 1 1  2 1 
Memorex (1992) 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Interco, Inc. 6  1 1 2 1 1 
Fairfield Communities 6  2 2 1   
Hills Department Stores 6  1 2 1 1 1 
JPS Textile Group 6  1 1 1 2 1 
New Valley Corp. 6  1 1 1 2 1 
Orion Pictures 6  1 2 1 1 1 
Continental Airlines (1990) 6  4 1   1 
Doskocil Companies 6  3 2   1 
Intermark, Inc. 6  2 2  1 1 
Federated Department Stores 5 1 1 1 1  1 
Great American Communications 5 1 1 1 1  1 
Memorex (1994) 5 1 1 1 1  1 
TWA (1993) 5 1 1 1  1 1 
Anacomp 5  1 1 1 1 1 
Best Products 5  1 1 1 1 1 
National Convenience Stores 5  1 1 1 1 1 
NVR 5  1 1 1 1 1 
Restaurant Enterprises 5  1 1 1 1 1 
Southland Corporation 5  1 1 1 1 1 
SPI Holding 5  1 1 1 1 1 
UDC Homes 5  1 1 1 1 1 
Jamesway Corporation 4 1 1 1   1 
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(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Number of 
investor 
priority 
levels 
(3) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(4) 
Unsecured
(5) 
Senior-
subordinated
(6) 
Junior 
subordinated
(7) 
Preferred 
stock 
(8) 
Common 
stock 
O’Brien Environmental Energy 4 1 1 1   1 
US Home Corp. 4 1 1 1   1 
Zale Corp. 4 1 1  1  1 
Rexene Corporation 4 1 1 1   1 
Calton, Inc. 4  1 1 1  1 
Forum Group 4  1 1 1  1 
General Development Corp. 4  1 1 1  1 
Insilco 4  1 1 1  1 
Revco 4  1 1 1  1 
Spreckels Industries 4  1 1 1  1 
USG Corporation 4  1 1 1  1 
AM International 4  1 1  1 1 
Americold 4  1 1  1 1 
Ames Department Stores 4  1 1  1 1 
Edisto Resources 4  1 1  1 1 
First City Bancorporation of Texas 4  1 1  1 1 
Resorts International 4  2 1   1 
West Point Acquisitions 4  1 1  1 1 
Bibb Company 3  1 1   1 
Circle K Corporation 3  1 1   1 
Continental Information Systems 3  1 1   1 
Gaylord Container 3  1 1   1 
Gilbert/Robinson 3  1 1   1 
Grand Union Company 3  1 1   1 
Hadson 3  1 1   1 
Harvard Industries 3  1 1   1 
Hexcel 3  1 1   1 
Hillsborough Holdings 3  1 1   1 
Ithaca Industries 3  1 1   1 
JWP, Inc. 3  1 1   1 
Mayflower Group 3  1 1   1 
Petrolane Gas 3  1 1   1 
Salant Corporation 3  1 1   1 
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(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Number of 
investor 
priority 
levels 
(3) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(4) 
Unsecured
(5) 
Senior-
subordinated
(6) 
Junior 
subordinated
(7) 
Preferred 
stock 
(8) 
Common 
stock 
Wang Laboratories 3  1 1   1 
WTD Industries 3  1 1   1 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. 3  1 1   1 
America West 3  1   1 1 
El Paso Electric 3  1   1 1 
Lone Star Industries 3  1   1 1 
Standard Brands Paint 3  1   1 1 
Sudbury 3  1   1 1 
Westmoreland Coal 3  1   1 1 
Eagle Pitcher 3  2    1 
Lomas Financial (1995) 3  2    1 
NACO Finance 3 1 1    1 
Alexander’s Inc. 2  1    1 
Carter Hawley Hale 2  1    1 
Emerson Radio 2  1    1 
International American Homes 2  1    1 
Kinder Care Learning Centers 2  1    1 
Rose’s Stores 2  1    1 
TGX Corporation 2  1    1 
Average / Total 4.3 18 84 66 33 33 84 
Total as a percentage of all cases  21% 100% 79% 39% 39% 100% 
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Appendix B. Single Residual Owner Firms 
(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(3) 
Unsecured 
(4) 
Senior 
subordinated 
(5) 
Junior 
subordinated
(6) 
Preferred 
stock 
(7) 
Common stock 
(8) 
Residual 
owner 
Alexander’s, Inc.  100 cents    unimpaired Common 
Americold  100 cents 100 cents  unimpaired unimpaired Common 
Edisto Resources  100 cents 90 cents  unimpaired $13 million Common 
Hexcel  100 cents 100 cents   unimpaired Common 
Hillsborough Holdings  100 cents 100 cents   dilution Common 
Kinder Care Learning  100 cents    14% of the common Common 
O’Brien Environmental 
Energy 
100 cents 100 cents 100 cents   51% of the common Common 
TGX Corporation  100 cents    unimpaired Common 
Westmoreland Coal  100 cents   unimpaired unimpaired Common 
New Valley Corp.  100 cents 100 cents 100 cents as ordered nominal Preferred 
Calton, Inc.  100 cents 100 cents 89 cents  $4 million Junior sub
AM International  100 cents 16-68 cents  nominal nominal Senior sub
Bibb Company  100 cents 46 cents   $4 million Senior sub
Grand Union Co (1995)  100 cents 63 cents   $1 million Senior sub
Harvard Industries  100 cents 60 cents   $4 million Senior sub
Interco, Inc.  100 cents 14+ cents 5 cents+ 0 0 Senior sub
Kash N Karry 100 cents 100 cents 48 cents  0 0 Senior sub
Mayflower Group  100 cents 69 cents   $6 million Senior sub
Petrolane Gas  100 cents 35+ cents   nominal Senior sub
Revco  100 cents 68 cents 4 cents  0 Senior sub
Rexene Corporation 100 cents 100 cents 67 cents   8% of the common Senior sub
America West  complex   nominal+ 0 Unsecureds
Ames Department Stores  13-77 cents 2 cents  0 0 Unsecureds
Best Products (1991)  47 cents 0 0 0 0 Unsecureds
Carter Hawley Hale  46 cents    nominal Unsecureds
Circle K Corporation  unknown 0   0 Unsecureds
Emerson Radio  18+ cents    0 Unsecureds
Greyhound Lines, Inc.  37 cents  0  0 Unsecureds
JWP, Inc.  34-58 cents nominal   nominal Unsecureds
Sudbury  85 cents   $2 million nominal Unsecureds
+ Indicates that class received additional property for which a value could not be assigned, usually warrants 
Separation of numbers by hyphen indicates a range of possible recoveries 
Separation by forward slash indicates different recoveries for classes at same priority level. 
Shading indicates residual owners classes. 
“Cents” are cents per dollar of claim paid to creditors in class. 
Appendix C. Multiple Residual Owner Firms 
(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(3) 
Unsecured 
(4) 
Senior 
subordinate 
(5) 
Junior 
subordinate
(6) 
Preferred 
stock 
(7) 
Common stock
(8) 
Number of 
residual 
owners 
Days Inn of America 50 cents 23 cents 9 cents 6 cents  0 2 
TWA (1993) 32 cents 20 cents 3 cents  0 0 2 
Zale Corp. 25 cents 18 cents  7 cents  0 2 
Eagle Pitcher  27 cents    0 21
El Paso Electric  65/80 cents   12% of the 
common + 
3% of the 
common + 
2 
General Development  23 cents 10 cents 2 cents  0 2 
Insilco  35/50 cents 19 cents 10 cents  $2 million 2 
Wang Laboratories  63+ cents 63+/2 cents   unknown 2* 
Anacomp  100 cents 87 cents 16 cents nominal nominal 2 
Cherokee, Inc. 100 cents 100 cents 63 cents 41 cents $1 million 8% of the 
common 
2 
Gilbert/Robinson  100 cents 100 cents   6% of the 
common 
2 
Great American 
Communications 
100 cents 100 cents 84 cents 75 cents  2% of the 
common 
2 
Hadson  100 cents 69 cents   $111 million 2 
JPS Textile Group  100 cents 58 cents 13 cents nominal 0 2 
Memorex (1992) 91+ cents 100 cents 37 cents 18 cents $5 million+ nominal 2 
Memorex (1994) 16 cents 100 cents 63 cents 13 cents  nominal 2 
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(1) 
Firm name 
(2) 
Senior 
unsecured 
(3) 
Unsecured 
(4) 
Senior 
subordinate 
(5) 
Junior 
subordinate
(6) 
Preferred 
stock 
(7) 
Common stock
(8) 
Number of 
residual 
owners 
Orion Pictures  100 cents 32/81 cents 10 cents nominal nominal 2 
Resorts International  100 cents 70 cents   $18 million 2* 
UDC Homes  100 cents 83 cents 21 cents 0 0 2 
US Home Corp. 100 cents 100 cents 85 cents   $41 million 2 
USG Corporation  100 cents 51 cents 12 cents  nominal 2 
West Point Acquisition  100 cents 32 cents  $20 million nominal 2 
WTD Industries  100 cents 100 cents   $3 million 2 
Restaurant Enterprises  100 cents 94 cents 65 cents $28 million $234,000 2 
Spreckels Industries  100 cents 100 cents 67 cents  25% of the 
common 
2 
Lone Star Industries  100 cents   84-90% of 
“face value” 
35% of the 
common 
2 
Bucyrus-Erie Company  by entity     2* 
Lomas Financial (1995)  10-15/66 cents    0 2* 
Federated Dept. Stores 89 cents 46 cents 15 cents 7 cents  0 3 
Jamesway Corp. (1993) 61 cents 53 cents 27 cents   nominal 3 
Intermark, Inc.  79 cents 36 cents  nominal nominal 3* 
National Convenience 
Stores 
 75 cents 37-42 cents 11 cents nominal nominal 3 
National Gypsum Corp. 86 cents 35 cents 86 cents 27 cents  0 3* 
NVR, Inc.  100/45 cents 59 cents 20 cents $2 million $9 million 3 
Salant Corporation  62 cents 87/62 cents   22-44% of the 
common 
3 
Standard Brands Paint  58 cents   25% of the 
common 
25% of the 
common 
3 
Charter Medical  100 cents 70 cents 38 cents $7 million 3% of the 
common 
3 
Hills Department Stores  105 cents 78 cents 30 cents stock nominal 3* 
Southland Corporation  100 cents 66/71/61 cents 54/27 cents 5% of the 
common 
7% of the 
common 
3 
Lomas Financial (1989) 83 cents 53 cents 36/21 cents  nominal nominal 3 
Envirodyne Industries 100 cents 65 cents 50 cents 18 cents  0 4* 
Fairfield Communities  42 cents 42 cents 42 cents  0 4* 
Tracor  100 cents 37/9 cents 1 cents  diluted 4* 
Continental Airlines  unknown 0   0 4* 
Continental Information 
Systems 
 59 cents 12 cents   0 5* 
Doskocil Companies  37 cents 18 cents   $3 million 5* 
LTV Corporation 26-31 
cents2
13-57 cents2 8-11 cents2  $500,000 $4 million 9* 
Amdura  by entity     Several* 
* Figure includes one or more residual owners resulting from additional entities in corporate group 
+ Indicates that class received additional property for which a value could not be assigned, usually warrants 
Separation of numbers by hyphen indicates a range of possible recoveries 
Separation by forward slash indicates different recoveries for classes at same priority level. 
Shading indicates residual owners classes. 
“Cents” are cents per dollar of claim paid to creditors in class. 
1 Eagle Pitcher commercial creditors and asbestos personal injury claimants were considered separate priority  levels because of the 
conflict of interest between present and future creditors 
2 LTV ranges of recovery are for multiple classes. Low number stated is for lowest end of any range; highest number stated is for 
highest end of any range. 
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